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Do Women Manage Smaller Funds?
* 
 
Based on a sample of 467 asset managers from four countries we robustly find that women 
manage smaller funds than men, despite tough competition in this industry. Interestingly, the 
gender gap exists only for managers of smaller funds, i.e. at the lower end of the hierarchy, 
as quantile regressions show. This is inconsistent with the glass ceiling hypothesis. Going 
further, this gender gap is limited to large firms. Explanations may refer to large firms using 
market power in the area of smaller funds or to “visibility” among top asset managers 
protecting against unequal treatment of the sexes. 
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This study examines the treatment of female and male asset managers who are respon-
sible for the investment of several hundred millions if not billions of US dollars. Their activity 
is under very close scrutiny both from within the firm and from the customers. Asset manag-
ers’ performance is measured daily and has to be presented to customers several times during 
the year. Insufficient performance leads to major reallocations of assets (Sirri and Tufano, 
1998). There is thus no question that competition is very tough in this occupation and will 
limit discrimination of women at the workplace. However, despite reduced outright discrimi-
nation of women, concerns have been raised that discrimination may have become more 
subtle, either by purpose or possibly unconsciously (Blau et al., 2006). As a consequence we 
do not examine the compensation of asset managers but we take one step back and ask for 
determinants of the asset managers’ fund size. 
Fund size seems a natural choice to indicate treatment at the workplace as asset manag-
ers aim for getting large funds under their management responsibility. Size in the form of 
large assets is an indicator of success in this industry as size is in other industries as well, such 
as responsibility for many people, high revenue or large geographical areas. Accordingly, 
junior asset managers have to demonstrate their ability with small funds and only successful 
asset managers will get responsibility for increasingly larger funds. Larger funds tend to 
generate higher earnings for the asset management firms and thus higher income for its asset 
manager but not the opposite way round.
1 Beyond the income dimension, large funds can also 
generate reputation for their managers, such as responsibility for large “flagship” funds. 
                                                 
1  See also Frank (1984) arguing that compensation may differ from performance or see Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller (1997) emphasizing that “hierarchical status in a firm is not necessarily synonymous with pay 
ranking” (p.44) and that “sexist promotion practices may serve as a handy substitute for pay discrimination” 
(p.66).   3
Therefore the volume of funds for which an asset manager is responsible is a clear indi-
cator of her career success as asset management firms will allocate larger funds to more able 
managers only. Our investigation leads to the unexpected result that women manage smaller 
funds, even controlling for a set of relevant determinants, such as experience, education, 
position, type of fund and risk aversion.  
We analyze the gender gap in three steps of increasing depth. First, we apply a standard 
framework to determine whether women are treated differently from men in this competitive 
occupation by testing whether women manage smaller funds. In order to get the necessary 
information we use a new broad data set compiled from a survey of asset managers in four 
countries, the United States, Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Second, we test by a quantile 
regression approach whether fund size differences between male and female asset managers 
are larger at the floor or at the ceiling of the fund size distribution. According to the glass 
ceiling hypothesis we expect stronger differences between men and women at the top of the 
fund size distribution, however, our evidence suggests the opposite. Third, we ask whether the 
treatment of women depends on firm size, where we hypothesize that larger firms enjoy more 
opportunities to avoid competitive pressures in some areas of the internal labor market. Fol-
lowing Yellen (1984) we suppose that employers can indulge costlessly their taste for dis-
crimination among bad but not among good jobs since there is stronger competition between 
firms for the latter jobs. This mechanism may be supported by the financial press’ main focus 
on the major large funds. We find, indeed, that women manage smaller funds than men (at the 
floor of the fund size distribution) within large firms only. 
Our research is related to a wealth of studies analyzing the treatment of women at the 
workplace (e.g. Altonji and Blank, 1999). We differ from many studies by conducting an 
international within-occupation study considering typical demographic variables, job charac-
teristics and individual attitudes in the total as well as in split samples. Our research is also 
related to a few studies analyzing the role of gender in asset management, including Atkinson   4
et al. (2003), Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) or more indirectly Green et al. (2009) and Madden 
(2008). These studies uniformly find that women do not generate risk-adjusted fund returns 
different from men, which makes it less probable that female asset managers may be charac-
terized by unobservable deficits in human capital. 
The paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 describes the data and the variables 
which are incorporated in our estimates. Results based on all available observations are pre-
sented in Section 3, results of subgroups in Section 4 and 5, whereas robustness tests are 
shown in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2  Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
The data of this research stems from an anonymous questionnaire survey which was 
conducted in 2003/04 in the United States (USA), Germany (GER), Switzerland (SUI) and 
Italy (ITA). These countries were chosen, first, to cover a variety of important markets for 
asset management, including the largest, i.e. the U.S.; second, countries reflect our access to 
supportive institutions, such as the umbrella organizations of asset management firms in 
Germany and Italy. Each survey was preceded by a series of intensive interviews with the 
members of the target group and by a pretest. Also the broad response of 567 very time-
constrained asset managers may indicate that professionals took this survey seriously.
2 
Regarding the representation of firms Table 1 shows that about 175 asset management 
firms participated in the four countries. The response rate differs between countries and is 
highest in countries where we received support from the apex organizations. The highest 
absolute number of 74, however, comes from the US, where we approached—in light of our 
limited resources—the largest 250 firms only. In order to test representativeness we have 
                                                 
2  The questionnaires were sent to the head of asset management in each firm who decided about further distribu-
tion. Usually we sent 2 to 6 copies by mail (depending on firm size) but sometimes the questionnaire was at-
tached to an email. So we do not fully control the number of distributed questionnaires and accordingly cannot 
provide an exact response rate. To make a rough calculation, we addressed 433 firms and assuming that 5 ques-
tionnaires were distributed on average, this makes a total of 2,165 and yields a response rate in the order of 26%.   5
ordered participating firms—as far as we could identify responses—according to their assets 
under management and then compared the distribution of our sample with that of the market.
3 
There are no significant differences in any country. 
Regarding the representation of asset managers Figure 1 shows the distribution of indi-
vidual assets under management (FUND SIZE_c) for our four countries and for the (un-
weighted) total.
4 The six categories are well represented in all countries, although some dif-
ferences between markets become obvious. 
In order to explain gender differences in managed fund size (FUND SIZE) we incorpo-
rate as set of potentially useful determinants. These determinants may be grouped into three 
categories, i.e. demographics, job characteristics and individual attitudes. Demographic vari-
ables primarily have an impact on human capital. The job characteristics, such as working in 
specific areas of asset management, may impact segregation and, finally, there are individual 
attitudes which seem to be obviously related to job performance. 
Starting with demographic determinants of FUND SIZE, career success is naturally re-
lated to increasing age and better education.
5 The true driver of success, however, is not just 
age but rather job experience (e.g. O’Neill and O’Neill, 2005). Picking up the argument made 
by Becker (1985) marital status, too, may be influential as far as it reflects a higher attention 
towards housework, including in particular taking care of children
6. Finally, we consider the 
hierarchical position that an asset manager has reached as this is very closely related to 
FUND SIZE and thus serves as a powerful proxy to capture otherwise hidden abilities. 
                                                 
3  Despite the opportunity to keep anonymity almost all firms have signalled their participation although the fund 
managers themselves always stayed anonymous. 
4  Volume figures in the US were of course compiled in US dollars, which are converted into Euros at the ex-
change rate of one reflecting market rates directly before the survey in 2002 and 2003. 
5  The importance of good education has been shown for asset managers by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), al-
though they find that the quality of the degree-granting institution matters and not so much as a degree as such. 
Menkhoff et al. (2006) find a positive impact of experience on investment behaviour. 
6 The number of children would be a better indicator to measure this influence. This information is not available. 
However, the interaction between the marital dummy, the gender dummy and the age of the fund manager could 
give some evidence. Preliminary investigations have shown that the coefficient of this interaction variable is 
negative as expected, however, completely insignificant.    6
Job characteristics may also influence fund size. We control for three potential influ-
ences in this respect. First, size of the asset management firm could be important if larger 
firms specialize on larger funds. Second, the kind of assets managed may systematically 
influence the volumes under management. It seems plausible in this respect that equities 
typically require more attention than bonds or money market instruments as equities differ in 
more dimensions to each other than different bonds do. Please, note that asset managers clas-
sify themselves according to their main responsibility. Third, the kind of fund, i.e. mutual or 
pensions fund, may be important too. Mutual funds mainly address individual investors and 
are thus debated for example in investor magazines, whereas pension funds and related other 
funds mainly have professional investors, such as life insurance firms who delegate part of 
their asset management to specialists. 
As a third group of characteristics we consider attitudes of asset managers.
7 The most 
important and robust variable is usually the volume of work which we approximate via a self-
stated number of working hours per week. Women—more than men—prefer working fewer 
hours in favor of time being left for other activities (Booth and van Ours, 2008). Furthermore, 
it has been found that the basis for compensation may influence the treatment of women in the 
sense that a more objective basis induces less fear of discrimination than a more subjective 
basis (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2002). Accordingly, we consider a proxy for this effect by meas-
uring the relative strength of subjective assessment for the size of bonus payments in relation 
to relative fund performance
8. As a final variable influencing career success Dohmen et al. 
(2009) find that lower personal risk aversion is an important attitude explaining success. 
Consideration of this variable seems particularly important here as women tend to be more 
                                                 
7  Please note that asset managers have no incentive for strategic answering as responses were given directly to 
the researchers in anonymous form. Anonymity has a price in that we cannot link our data to objective measures 
of fund returns. We emphasize, however, that gender is no determinant of performance, i.e. risk-adjusted returns, 
according to available evidence (see footnote 2). 
8 Subjective base for the size of bonus payments means that the criterion is not clear for the fund managers that 
the superior decides about the bonus payment. An objective base is completely comprehensible for the fund 
manager. In our survey it is asked for the degree of objective and subjective base (see table 2, BONUS1 and 
BONUS2) and we determine the difference between these two categorical variables, measured by count data.   7
risk averse than men in general.
9 In order to distinguish this effect from risk aversion being 
related to investment decisions we also use as a control the degree of preferred investment 
risk.  
Variable definitions and their coding are shown in Table 2. The resulting information 
about participating asset managers is presented in an aggregated way in Table 3, starting with 
the average individual volume of assets under management. The last columns of Table 3 show 
the average figures for male and female asset managers. It is obvious that women manage 
much smaller funds than men. This is just descriptive information though. The next row 
presents the share of female asset managers, varying between 8.1% in Switzerland and 16.3% 
in Italy. The overall low representation of women in asset management is substantially below 
the share of female students in finance or economics. One reason for this segregation may be 
that asset management has a lot of “male” attributes, such as being analytical and impersonal, 
requiring tough negotiations and willing to take risks. 
Further information shows that the average respondent (equal weighting of countries) is 
about 35 - 42 years old, has almost ten years of  professional experience in asset management 
and is married (about 58% of respondents). About 80% of asset managers have a university 
degree. Possibly more important for the relevance of our data set is the fact that most respon-
dents have a senior position (84%), starting with senior asset managers up to many chief 
investment or executive officers answering the questions. 
With regards to the representation of various segments of fund management (see Table 
3), the sample comprises—with marked differences between countries—managers of equity 
and other funds (bonds and money market) in almost equal proportions. Similarly mutual fund 
managers are well represented with almost 40%, the remaining respondents managing either 
                                                 
9  There is a lot of evidence from various angles, including Barber and Odean (2001), Dwyer et al. (2002), Eckel 
and Grossman (2008), Olsen and Cox (2001), Sunden and Surette (1998), Niessen and Ruenzi (2007). Schubert 
et al. (1999) find, however, that a gender difference may be subject to framing.   8
pension (and other special) funds or both, i.e. mutual and pension funds. Also managers of 
small and large asset management firms are well covered as we will analyze later. 
Finally, in order to learn more about the hidden characteristics of asset managers we ask 
them about four items of individual attitudes and work patterns (see towards bottom of Table 
3): first, regarding their weekly working hours—indicating volume of work; second, regard-
ing the relative importance of subjective versus objective performance-based bonus remunera-
tion; third, regarding their general risk aversion by way of a lottery equivalent—as an indica-
tor of willingness to accept risk and thus to be possibly more successful in career develop-
ment; fourth and finally, regarding asset managers’ propensity to act less risk averse in in-
vestment decisions. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that working hours per week are evi-
dently higher than in most other occupations, that working time in Europe—in this occupation 
as in others—is lower than in the US and that women work less than men on average. More-
over, bonuses are a bit more often determined by subjective assessments than by relative fund 
performance and asset managers do not seem particularly risk averse. The latter is indicated 
by self assessment as well as by their stated risk aversion as shown by the last item 
(RISK_general) indicted: respondents require a compensation of less than 2000 Euro when 
1000 Euro are at stake, i.e. a factor of below 2, whereas the general population requires rather 
a factor above 2 (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). It is worth noting that bonuses of female 
asset managers are to the same extent based on subjective assessment than for men (see Table 
3, line BONUS). This indicates that employers do not have a propensity to discriminate fe-
male managers via subjective assessment. 
Overall, the survey data should provide reliable and largely representative information 
for the following analyses. 
 
3  Results for the entire sample   9
This section develops the main finding, that women manage smaller funds, in three 
steps. First, we show relations between variables and asset managers’ responsibility for fund 
volume (FUND SIZE_c). Second, we provide regressions explaining fund size, and, third, we 
run a standard Oaxaca Blinder decomposition in order to better identify the unexplained 
difference of fund size between female and male asset managers. 
Our statistical measures of association between fund size and personal or job-specific 
variables which could be determinants of fund size give the expected results (see Table 4): in 
particular, female asset managers have smaller volumes than their male colleagues. However, 
there are some cross-country differences, as the correlation is not significant in the U.S. and in 
Switzerland. Beyond this, asset managers have responsibility for larger volumes if they are 
older, more experienced, in a more senior position, work in a larger firm and work more hours 
per week. The effect of a graduate degree is insignificant for three countries, but holds in 
Germany and in the total sample. The degree of risk aversion does not seem to be correlated 
with FUND SIZE. Equity fund managers have smaller volumes than bond and money market 
fund managers, mutual fund managers tend to have smaller volumes than others. 
Next, we put all of these possible determinants into a multivariate regression. Here we 
use FUND SIZE in its logarithmic form because nonlinear relations are expected due to satu-
ration effects.
10 The resulting regression, given in Table 5 as specification (1), provides good 
overall explanatory power for this type of approach with an R-squared of 0.343. Moreover, 
most variables are significant and coefficient signs confirm ex ante expectations. In compari-
son to the relations presented in Table 4, there are a few changes. Interestingly, better educa-
tion has only an insignificant impact on fund size in the multivariate regression and also fund 
type (mutual fund or other type) does not seem to be important anymore. Finally, country 
dummies show that Swiss asset managers have systematically smaller assets under manage-
                                                 
10  Preliminary empirical investigations confirm this. The fit in models with FUND SIZE as dependent variable 
instead of log(FUND SIZE) is much worse and several coefficients are insignificant. Saturation means that the 
influence of all determinants on FUND SIZE is restricted and cannot be infinite. Therefore, the quantitative 
effect cannot be linear over the entire range.   10
ment than their German colleagues. Most interesting for our research is the fact that the coef-
ficient of the FEMALE variable is highly significant and indicates that women do indeed 
manage smaller funds, even controlling for a large set of potential determinants of fund size. 
Several of our variables have neither been significant in the bivariate relations nor in 
specification (1). We thus aim for a more parsimonious specification. We reduce the number 
of variables included step by step according to their lowest level of significance each until we 
realize specification (2). Fortunately, this specification is quite robust in three ways. First, it 
seems to be independent from the ordering in which variables are excluded. Second, all vari-
ables included prove to be very robust to the set of variables being included in the regression 
(with some qualification for the variable “mutual fund” though). Third, the variable “POSI-
TION” does not seem to be endogenous.
11 
With this parsimonious benchmark specification at hand, we apply the standard Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition to our data. Necessary for this calculation are separated estimates for 
men and women based on the specification in column 2, Table 5.
12 We find that about 45% of 
the gender gap in fund size is explained by their different endowment but that 55% remain 
unexplained in our approach.
13 This indicates that female asset managers may be subject to 
discrimination—in the conventional sense of describing the unexplained part of the gender 
gap in fund size—which seems surprising to us in this highly competitive environment of 
asset management. Competition in asset management should be tough as outcomes can be 
quite precisely measured. Inferior outcomes lead to money outflows (or relatively less in-
                                                 
11  One could argue that the regressor “POSITION” is endogenous, so that FUND SIZE has also influence on 
POSITION (larger fund size leads to higher probability of being promoted). However, the Hausman test does not 
reject exogeneity.The test is based on the comparison of a 2SLS estimator and the OLS estimator where POSI-
TION is determined by MARRIED, AGE, GRADUATE, BONUS and RISK_invest. The CHI² statistic is 8.89 
and the probvalue 0.54. 
12  Detailed coefficient estimates are not presented in the tables as the t-statistics of the female coefficient esti-
mates are insignificant due to the limited number of women in the sample. Fortunately, this does not influence 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The comparison demonstrates strong differences between male and female 
coefficients of the regressor POSITION. The higher is position the larger are the funds for which male managers 
are responsible whereas this relation is much weaker for women.  
13  The result is almost identical when applying the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition. Accordingly, T=1.0652, 
Q=0.4162, P=0.5284, U=0.1207, where T = total difference, Q = contribution of differences in observable 
quantities, P = contribution of differences in observable prices (i.e. consistent with discrimination) and U = 
contribution of differences in unobservable quantities and prices (i.e. may partially be due to discrimination).   11
flows) and thus to reduced income as contracts reward assets under management with a linear 
management fee. 
Possible reasons for this discrepancy between men and women are discussed by Niessen 
and Ruenzi (2007) who analyze net inflows into female or male managed funds: fund inves-
tors may have negative preconception about the abilities of female asset managers, fund man-
agement companies may discriminate by not advertising female managed funds, fund brokers 
may assess female asset managers as less able or financial press may report less about female 
managed funds. Madden (2008) emphasizes the possibility that fund management firms may 
discriminate against women by the assignment of complementary inputs. She mentions office 
amenities, support staff, the title that a broker is allowed to use on her business card, size and 
quality of the broker’s office (which impacts work efficiency and signals reputation to cus-
tomers). Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that either omitted variables or meas-
urement error explain partially our result of the unexplained gender gap, although our study 
covers core variables put forward by the literature (e.g. O’Neill and O’Neill, 2005), such as 
experience and working hours. 
According to this argument one could speculate whether women have unobserved char-
acteristics that reduce their chances of being successful asset managers. Such a characteristic 
might be “confidence in investment decisions” (Estes and Hosseini, 1988). Another character-
istic sometimes mentioned is that women tend to “shy away from competition” (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007, see also Gneezy et al., 2003, Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In the asset man-
agement industry, however, women are grossly underrepresented and those who chose to 
work there obviously need confidence in their decisions and willingness to stand in the tour-
nament competition. 
Therefore, further analyses seem useful in order to understand the unequal treatment of 
women. As a step in this direction we split our sample and test possible implications which 
cannot be examined with the entire sample.   12
 
4  Results for specific groups: individual assets under management 
Studies on the treatment of women typically find that unequal treatment increases with 
the prestige of jobs (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1997). We use our sample to test this 
hypothesis in a within occupation setting. Interestingly, we find the reverse of the “glass 
ceiling hypothesis”, a phrase used by Albrecht et al. (2003) showing that the gender wage gap 
in Sweden increases with higher wages and in particular at the top end: the smaller the fund 
size the more obvious does unequal treatment to the disadvantage of women become. 
In order to test whether the relation between the treatment of women and the quality of 
jobs differs with respect to fund size, we apply a quantile regression approach considering the 
variables from our benchmark regression, i.e. specification (2) in Table 5. Results presented in 
Table 6 show all coefficients, including those of the FEMALE variable, for the quantiles 
being distinguished. The FEMALE coefficients are insignificant at the top of the fund size 
distribution, at the 90
th and 75
th percentile, and become almost consistently larger and signifi-
cant towards the bottom at the 25
th and 10
th percentile, and thus reveal a clear pattern. Reas-
suringly, this pattern does not come at the cost of unwanted changes in the other variables 
although some variables become insignificant. 
The decomposition into endowment and unexplained effects is also applied to the quan-
tile regression approach. We find the following interesting result: The higher the quantile the 
lower is the unexplained part of fund size differences between males and females. For the 0.9 
quantile only 28 percent are explained by this effect while the 0.1 quantile documents even an 
endowment advantages for women. 
In contrast to this finding, it has been argued that discriminatory practices are more 
prevalent among better jobs. Reasons for such a “glass ceiling”, i.e. unobserved barriers at 
higher hierarchical levels, could be family background influences which have negative effects 
for women (Bell et al., 2008). This hinders women to be promoted in upper hierarchical levels   13
and if so only under high costs in the sense of their “overqualification”. These barriers con-
tribute also to the increasing gender gap within firm’s hierarchy. There is some evidence for 
the “glass ceiling” hypothesis with respect to wages in the literature (e.g. Albrecht et al., 
2003, Hübler, 2005, Arulampalam et al., 2007, de la Rica et al., 2008). 
However, it is not fully obvious that the hypothesis of increasing discrimination within 
a firm’s hierarchy—here measured by the individual volume of administered assets—should 
hold in a comparatively competitive environment such as the asset management industry. 
Tough competition harms those firms practicing discrimination of women more severely than 
in less competitive areas (see Meng, 2004). Somewhat differentiating this argument, we do 
not expect that competition is equally pressing at all levels of a firm’s hierarchy: first, dis-
crimination is less costly per employee in the lower positions (although not necessarily in 
relative terms) so that firms can easier practice market power there.
14 Second, the demand for 
jobs is higher at the top end of the hierarchy which leads to more competition among firms 
respectively. Third, we speculate that top jobs may be more in the public eye which could also 
contribute to respective costs of discrimination. However, we have no clear evidence for this 
claim. Perhaps this is only true for a few star performers featured in the financial press. Ac-
cordingly, competition makes discrimination at the top end of the spectrum more costly and 
may rather reduce discrimination for the best jobs, i.e. for the employees with the largest 
individual funds. Thus we argue that also the opposite of the glass ceiling hypothesis may 
hold. 
Similar results to ours are found in the analysis of gender wage gap by Bonjour and Ger-
fin (2001) in Switzerland and by de la Rica et al. (2008) for less-educated in Spain. The latter 
call this phenomenon “floor pattern” and argue that it can be explained by statistical discrimi-
nation when specific training is required to perform well on a job. 
                                                 
14  If funds are managed by second best managers as firms discriminate women, this leads to relatively worse 
performance and then to a relatively declining fund volume. Any relative loss of competitiveness and volume is 
more severe at a large than at a small fund.   14
As this floor pattern is a rather unusual finding in the overall literature, we will analyze 
it in more detail. 
 
5  Results for specific groups: individual assets and firm size 
This section examines empirically whether the fact that smaller funds are managed by 
female asset managers is related to firm size. For this purpose we reproduce the quantile 
regression approach of the preceding section, but now being further disaggregated into small-
er and larger firms. We split firms into the first three versus the last three categories as docu-
mented in Table 2, i.e. the dividing line is total assets under management of 20 billion Euro. 
Table 7 shows results which indeed reveal that the earlier finding on FUND SIZE (see Section 
4 above) has to be rooted in practice at larger firms: it is asset managers with smaller FUND 
SIZE at larger firms where the FEMALE variable has explanatory power. Gender neither 
seems to be important in smaller firms nor for asset managers with great responsibilities at 
larger firms. 
This finding is consistent with a specific floor gender gap hypothesis, namely only for 
large firms. Accordingly, small firms cannot afford costly discriminatory practices as single 
asset managers make larger marginal contributions to the firm’s revenues. By contrast, larger 
firms can more easily survive with some degree of inefficient behavior as long as inefficien-
cies do not occur in core areas. With respect to our case here, and referring to Section 4, larger 
firms can easier afford a (possibly inefficient) worse treatment of women than small firms as 
long as it applies to the smaller funds within large firms. From this perspective, discrimination 
will occur in more marginal areas of the firm and thus does not harm so much. Of course, the 
argument applies in the same manner if we assume that larger firms enjoy some market pow-
er. More generally, we carry over the arguments from above Section 4—i.e. small funds go 
along with lower costs, less hiring competition and less visibility—and argue that large em-  15
ployers will tend to concentrate their discrimination policy on jobs at the bottom of the firm’s 
hierarchy. 
We note that our finding is not fully consistent with Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) who ar-
gue—with data for the U.S.—that large companies are more likely to be sued in anti-
discrimination lawsuits and cater more institutional investors who ask for workforce diversity. 
Following these arguments one would expect that women managing large and small funds are 
not discriminated in large companies. Our finding indicates that the niche where women 
manage smaller funds is noticed with less attention, so that discriminatory practices may 
survive. We cannot rule out, too, that the niche we identify is exactly the place where women 
with less energy for their job are clustering. 
 
6 Robustness 
In order to test the robustness of our results we proceed in three directions, i.e. we ex-
amine new methods, new sample splits and new specifications. Our main findings seem to be 
robust. 
Regarding our method of choice, we have preferred a standard OLS approach which has 
the advantage of allowing further extensions—such as decomposition and the quantile regres-
sion—and the advantage of allowing better comparability with earlier research. If individual 
volume is used in classified or in interval-coded form, however, in this case according to six 
categories (FUND SIZE_c – see Table 2), an ordered probit approach or an interval regression 
(see Wooldridge 2002, p. 509) should be applied. Specification (3) and (4) in the above intro-
duced Table 5 provides coefficients and their significance levels for this alternative estimation 
method. As can be seen, the findings from this alternative approach are very similar. 
When using a classified dependent variable the quantile estimator is not suitable. An al-
ternative is provided by the generalized ordered probit estimates (Boes and Winkelmann 
2006) where separate estimates of each category of individual volume of assets (FUND   16
SIZE_c) are determined. The results which are not presented in the tables demonstrate the 
following: the lower is the category of FUND SIZE_c, the stronger is the gender effect and 
the higher is the p-value. In high categories the gender effect is statistically negligible. This is 
an important robustness check which supports our results in Table 6. 
Regarding a second direction of robustness tests, we examine further splits of our sam-
ple. Section 5 introduces firm size as an indicator of the degree of competition in the market 
and one may speculate about further information in our sample serving the same purpose (see 
Table 8). Accordingly, we hypothesize that the U.S. market may be more competitive than the 
three other markets under consideration. One reason for the high competitiveness in the U.S. 
market, beyond a generally high degree of sophistication due to a capital market based finan-
cial system, stems from the fact that the large U.S. asset management firms are typically 
independent institutions, developing their own company agenda, whereas asset management 
firms often belong to bank conglomerates in continental Europe; as subsidiaries, their com-
pany policy depends on the banks’ preferences. There is indeed evidence consistent with this 
view as the FEMALE coefficients in Panel A of Table 8 indicate. We hesitate, however, to 
further differentiate the European countries in this respect. Examining another implication, 
funds basically address either more individual investors (mutual funds - MFUND) or profes-
sional investors (pension funds - PFUND), where the latter provide a more competitive envi-
ronment for the asset managers. The respective split in the sample and separated regressions 
indicate that the FEMALE coefficient is significant in the less competitive segment (Table 8, 
Panel B). We are aware though that this distinction is blurred as sometimes professionals 
invest in mutual funds and individual investors allocate their pension wealth to particular 
funds. However, our finding is not fully consistent with a rational response of firms towards 
individual investors’ discrimination against female fund managers. As a last exercise in this 
direction, we hypothesize that the competitive pressure found in Section 5 may also be re-
flected in hierarchical position in the sense that differential treatment of women disappears at   17
the top. Panel C of Table 8 shows that differences in this respect are not strong, however, they 
are consistent with the hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, it may somewhat unexpected—according to Panel C of Table 8—that the 
lowest ranking female junior managers manage funds of equivalent size to their male counter-
parts, yet women in the lower quantiles get smaller funds than their male colleagues – see 
Table 6. Therefore, we examine the lowest quantile in more detail again. We split the 0.1 
quantile into subsamples of POSITION=1 (junior manager) and POSITION=2 (senior man-
ager) and estimate the last column of Table 6 separately. Indeed, the only significant differ-
ence between men and women is in the subsample of senior managers, i.e. consistent with 
Table 8 (the t-statistic of the female coefficient is 0.08 and -4.06 respectively). 
Regarding our third direction of robustness tests we perform a large set of alternative 
specifications. There are, indeed, some variables which may be sometimes significant depend-
ing on specification but none of them is robust so that it would deserve inclusion in the 
benchmark specification (see Table 4, specification 2). Moreover, we have also investigated 
the influence of interactions with the gender variable and we have estimated separated models 
for men and women which are the base of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (see Section 4). 
In most cases interaction effects are statistically insignificant. Finally, a recursive model with 
a position equation and the individual volume of administered assets is estimated. The coeffi-
cient of the FEMALE variable in the latter equation remains negatively significant. Overall, 
our main findings seem to be robust. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Asset managers aim for getting large funds under their responsibility, an ambition 
which seems natural in this competitive field where prestige, promotion, prospects and renu-
meration are strongly linked to the fund size under individual management. In our sample of 
467 asset managers from four countries a large set of plausible determinants of the individual   18
volume of assets under management (FUND SIZE) is analyzed. Our investigation shows that 
managers with experience, in high positions and long working time manage larger funds. 
Surprisingly, gender is also one of these determinants as men tend to manage larger funds 
than women. So far, our study contributes to a large body of literature documenting unequal 
treatment of women and men at the workplace, here for a particular occupation which has not 
yet been examined in this way. 
However, this study also provides more general insights: first, the occupation being ana-
lyzed is characterized by tough competition among asset managers and asset management 
firms. It is thus even more surprising that our finding seems to be so conventional. Second, we 
analyze unequal treatment of the sexes for the different fund volumes. The glass ceiling hy-
pothesis expects more inequality at the top but our evidence is against this expectation. Third, 
more unequal treatment may be expected in larger firms, which is indeed the case in our 
sample. Moreover, the last two effects discussed add up in the sense that unequal treatment is 
most pronounced for smaller fund sizes in large firms. A set of robustness checks supports the 
main findings.  
Much of our evidence which we relate to the market power of large firms can also be under-
stood as supporting a “visibility” hypothesis. Accordingly, unequal treatment of the sexes 
occurs less where visibility is higher, that is for top asset managers—with high asset vol-
umes—and in small firms where the treatment of individuals is rather less anonymous. Fur-










TABLE  1. On the representativeness of responses 
 










































H0: Structure of responding firms equals 
















(a)Firms are characterized by asset under management. The figures are the z-value of the 














123456 123456 123456 123456 123456
 
 
Note: Answer about “personal responsibility for assets under management” are given in six categories (in million 
of Euro): 1 (<50), 2 (50-250), 3 (250-1.000), 4 (1.000-2.500), 5 (2.500-10.000), 6 (>10.000). 
 
 
USA GER  SUI  ITA Total   20
 











Classified FUND SIZE (=1, if <50 million €; =2, if 50-<250; =3, if 250-
<1,000); =4, if 1,000-<2,500; =5, if 2,500-<10,000; =6, if >=10,000) 
Assumptions: class midpoints are class means, open classes 1 and 6 have 








Age classified (=1, if age is <31; =2, if 31-35; =3, if 36-40; =4, if 41-45; 




Professional experience in asset management (=1, if <4 years; =2, if 4-6; 












Current position within the company (=1, if junior asset manager; =2, if 






Classified firm’s total volume of assets under management (=1, if <5 















Average working hours per week (=1, if <41 hours; =2, if 41-45; =3, if 




Bonus determination is based on relative fund performance (=1, if highest 




Bonus determination is based on subjective assessment by superiors and 








“Please classify your personal risk-taking: In respect of professional in-
vestment decisions, I mostly act … ” (=1, if very risk averse, …, =6, if 









“Imagine someone offers you a bet and the odds are fifty-fifty. You will 
have to pay 1,000 Euro/USD from your personal account, if you lose. 
What would be the minimum amount you would expect to win to lure you 
into accepting the bet? At least … Euro/USD.” 
 
Classified RISK_general (=1, if bet<=1000; =2, if >1000-1500; =3, if 
>1500-2500; =4, if >2500-5000; =5, if >5000-25000; =6, if >25000)   21
TABLE  3.   Descriptive statistics  
 

















AVERAGE FUND SIZE 






















































































































































































































































1 Share BONUS1 ≥ BONUS2, i.e. where subjective assessment is more important than rela-
tive fund performance. 
2 Share of response categories 1-3. 
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TABLE  4.  Measures of association (Kendall’s tau) - relations between classified individ-
ual volume (FUND SIZE_c) and other variables separated by countries 
 
          























































































































































































































Notes: *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. * denotes significance 
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TABLE  5.   Estimates of  individual fund size 
              
                         log(FUND SIZE)           log(FUND SIZE)          Interval data of          FUND SIZE_c 
                                                                                                             log(FUND SIZE_c) 
                                    OLS                                 OLS                        Interval Regression   Ordered Probit 
                                                                                                                       
 
FEMALE                     -0.543 ***                    -0.573 **                    -0.626**                       -0.385 **       
                                     (0.262)[0.299]              (0.230)[0.276]            (0.260)[0.306]             (0.161)[0.188] 
MARRIED                   -0.129  
                                     (0.170)[0.170]  
AGE                             -0.081  
                                     (0.093)[0.093] 
GRADUATE                0.274      
                                     (0.220) 0.203]  
EXPERIENCE             0.249 ***                      0.203 ***                  0.235***                     0.144 ***  
                                     (0.080)[0.081]              (0.051)[0.053]           (0.058)[0.060]             (0.036)[0.037] 
POSITION                    0.331 ***                      0.282 ***                  0.350***                     0.218 *** 
                                     (0.113)[0.116]              (0.101)[0.106]            (0.115)[0.123]             (0.072)[0.079] 
WORKING HOURS    0.153 **                        0.161**                      0.200**                       0.126 *** 
                                     (0.073)[0.081]              (0.067)[0.074]            (0.076)[0.086]             (0.048)[0.054] 
BONUS                        -0.141  
                                     (0.161)[0.169] 
RISK_invest                 -0.128  
                                      (0.079)[0.070]  
RISK_general/10
12         0.029               
                                      (0.152)[0.275] 
MFUND                        -0.207                            -0.276 *                    -0.357**                      -0.218 ** 
                                      (0.169)[0.181]               (0.150)[0.160]            (0.171)[0.181]             (0.106)[0.111] 
EQUITIES                    -0.639 ***                     -0.594 ***                 -0.687***                    -0.428 *** 
                                       (0.165)[0.159]              (0.149)[0.142]            (0.170)[0.162]             (0.106)[0.105] 
VOL_firm                      0.373  ***                      0.377 ***                  0.442***                     0.274  *** 
                                       (0.047)[0.046]              (0.042)[0.042]            (0.048)[0.048]             (0.031)[0.034] 
USA                              -0.057                             0.071                         -0.108                            0.071 
                                      (0.204)[0.219]               (0.186)[0.204]            (0.212)[0.231]             (0.131)[0.143] 
ITALY                            0.001                             0.209                          0.298                           0.181 
                                      (0.244)[0.236]              (0.211)[0.200]             (0.240)[0.232]             (0.148)[0.236]  
SWITZERLAND          -0.960 ***                    -0.967 ***                   -1.097***                    -0.679 *** 
                                      (0.320)[0.300]              (0.273)[0.292]             (0.310)[0.331]             (0.193)[0.300] 
CONSTANT                  4.659 ***                     4.182 ***                     3.517*** 
                                      (0.478)[0.444]              (0.297)[0.285]             (0.342)[0.336]  
CUT1                                                                                                                                           0.271  
                                                                                                                                                    (0.222)[0.212] 
CUT2                                                                                                                                            1.256 *** 
                                                                                                                                                    (0.216)[0.234] 
CUT3                                                                                                                                            2.687 *** 
                                                                                                                                                    (0.234)[0.273] 
CUT4                                                                                                                                            3.061 *** 
                                                                                                                                                    (0.225)[0.255]  
CUT5                                                                                                                                            3.535 *** 
                                                                                                                                                     (0.252)[0.298]   
Observations                          394                                   467                          467                               467 
R-squared                            0.343                                0.325          Chi²    201.7***   Pseudo-R²    0.118  
RESET                                0.162                                0.236 
B-P-T                                  0.087                                0.142 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses, robust standard errors in brackets. *** denotes significance at 
the 0.01 level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. * denotes significance at the 0.10 level based on 
robust standard errors. In line RESET (regression specification error test) and line B-P-T (Breusch Pagan 
test for homoscedasticity) p-values are presented.  CUT1-CUT5 are unobserved cut-points. 






TABLE  6.   Quantile estimates of  (log) individual fund size - log(FUND SIZE) 
 
 




            
                    
 -0.129                  -0.052            
 (0.272)                 (0.293) 
          
     -0.626*              -0.781**              -1.177** 
       (0.335)              (0.330)                (0.466) 
 
EXPERIENCE       
 
0.064**                  0.151**      
(0.063)                   (0.064) 
          
      0.137*                0.296***            0.274***  





0.257*                    0.307**     
(0.132)                   (0.125) 
      0.438***              0.404**             0.159  
       (0.147)                (0.161)              (0.178)      
    
WORKING HOURS   0.129                      0.197** 
 (0.093)                    (0.088) 
       0.202**              0.162                 0.177 






                       
-0.296                    -0.162        
(0.194)                    (0.189) 
                                                   
-0.437**                -0.667***     
(0.178)                    (0.189)   
       
       -0.205              -0.404*                -0.640* 
       (0.22)               (0.223)                 (0.315) 
       
       -0.643***       -0.727***            -0.426* 
        (0.217)            (0.214)                (0.250) 
 
VOL_firm          
 
0.386***                 0.447*** 
(0.053)                    (0.052) 
 
         
        0.390***         0.350***            0.305*** 











0.476**                   0.429* 
(0.236)                    (0.243) 
 
0.386                      0.255 
(0.312)                   (0.273) 
 
-0.437                     -0.394 
(0.341)                    (0.331) 
 
6.231***                 4.715*** 
(0.288)                     (0.352)  
        0.236                -0.216                -0.841** 
        (0.272)              (0.289)               (0.369) 
 
         0.185                0.027                0.470 
         (0.309)             (0.301)              (0.400) 
 
        -0.866**          -1.158***         -1.561***    
         (0.398)              (0.407)              (0.497) 
 
         3.899***         3.152***            2.852*** 
          (0.427)           (0.425)                (0.565) 
 
Observations                  467 
Pseudo R-squared          0.171                      0.232                  0.247               0.202                   0.119  
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. * denotes significance 
at the 0.10 level.  
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TABLE  7.   Quantile estimates of FEMALE coefficients of (log) individual fund size 
separated by firm size 
 
     




0.90 QUANTILE                      -0.169(0.505)               -0.019 (0.409)    
 
0.75 QUANTILE                       -0.398 (0.389)                0.030 (0.454) 
 
0.50 QUANTILE                       -0.211 (0.318)               -0.575 (0.483) 
 
0.25 QUANTILE                       -0.472 (0.496)               -1.598 (0.335) *** 
 
0.10 QUANTILE                       -0.325 (0.574)               -1.886 (0.720) ***  
 
Observations:                                                214                                         253 
 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. * denotes significance 





































  0.128      
  (0.451) 
  [104] 
 
-0.768**    
 (0.324) 
   [231] 
 
 
-0.982     
(0.769) 
  [80] 
 
-0.428              
(1.382) 
  [52] 
 
  
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. * denotes significance 
at the 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses, number of observations in brackets.  The same control 
variables are considered as in Table 5, column (2).  






-0.687***   
(0.253) 
[339]   26
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